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Abstract
We show that the labour share of income is an important factor aﬀecting the mechanisms
behind ﬁscal consolidation programs, thus requiring consideration when evaluating ﬁscal mul-
tipliers across countries. We calibrate a life-cycle, overlapping generations model to match
key characteristics of diﬀerent European economies and evaluate the recessive impacts of ﬁscal
consolidation programs. We ﬁnd a positive relationship between the labour share and the impact
ﬁscal multipliers generated by our model. This result directly follows from the higher weight
of labour on production and the lower opportunity cost of leisure present in economies with a
higher labour share. Following the impact period, the relationship between the labour share and
the ﬁscal multipliers is dependent on the type of ﬁscal instrument employed in the consolidation.
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1 Introduction
Following the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, several European economies were faced with historically high
sovereign debt levels. Consequently, many of these countries began developing plans to reduce their
indebtedness, either through reductions in government spending, tax increases or a combination of
both. This episode brought a renewed interest in ﬁscal policy, in particular the impacts of ﬁscal
consolidation programs and the ﬁscal multipliers (see Blanchard and Leigh (2013) and Alesina et al.
(2015a)). As standard in the literature, ﬁscal multipliers are not homogeneous across economies
and time, but rather dependent on country characteristics, the state of the economy and the type of
ﬁscal instruments employed. Recent studies have thus focused on trying to pinpoint the sensibility
of the ﬁscal multiplier for each of the aforementioned factors.
A common feature among the literature, namely when performing model calibrations, is the
assumption that the labour income share revolves around two-thirds of the overall economy’s income.
As the labour sharemeasures the fraction of national income accruing to labour (seeKrueger (1999)),
the assumption that such variable is equal across countries and time is quite strong. Indeed, as we
show in Figure 1, there is a pronounced cross-country labour share heterogeneity for a sample of
15 European countries, with values rather diﬀerent from 66%.
In this paper, we study how the labour share aﬀects the mechanisms behind ﬁscal consolidation
programs. We use the model proposed in Brinca et al. (2016), which is an overlapping generations
model with heterogeneous agents, incomplete markets, exogenous credit constraints, uninsurable
idiosyncratic risk and a bequest motive as introduced in Brinca et al. (2019b). We begin by
calibrating the model to a benchmark economy (Germany) under diﬀerent labour share values. We
then analyze how each of these diﬀerently calibrated economies respond to a gradual reduction
in government debt, either through a cut in government spending or an increase in labour income
taxation. To study whether the relationship between the labour share and the ﬁscal multiplier is
strong enough to hold when taking into account diﬀerent country characteristics, we perform a
multi-country exercise where we calibrate our model to match a wide range of country-speciﬁc data
moments from a sample of 9 European economies and perform the same ﬁscal shock.
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Figure 1: Labour share heterogeneity. The reference line corresponds to a labour share value of 66%.
We ﬁnd that output falls in the short-run due to the ﬁscal consolidation shock, but gradually
converges to a higher level at the end of the debt reduction program. The mechanism is similar
to the one proposed in Brinca et al. (2019b): As the government pays its debt, the number of
sovereign bonds in the economy decreases, leading households to gradually shift their savings
towards physical capital. The consequent increase in the capital-to-labour ratio boosts the marginal
productivity of labour, which increases total production. Market clearing conditions imply that the
wage rate must equal the marginal productivity of labour, so the wage rate also rises. With gradually
increasing wages, the expected life-time income of workers increases. Thus, the labour supply, and
consequently output, drop in the short-run.
As is standard in the literature (see Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Alesina et al. (2015b)),
we ﬁnd that increases in labour taxation have more severe eﬀects than reductions in government
spending. Since the disposable income of workers is particularly aﬀected with the tax increase,
the short-run labour supply drops considerably more. Such drop is strong enough to make workers
consume their savings. Hence, and opposite to the spending reduction scenario, we ﬁnd that capital
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actually decreases following the labour tax shock. As such, output drops even further.
We also ﬁnd a positive relationship between the labour share and the impact ﬁscal multipliers
generated by our model, either through a ﬁscal consolidation via spending or via labour taxation.
As the weight of labour on production is higher, an economy with a higher labour share has a lower
capital-to-labour ratio. Subsequently, the marginal productivity of labour is lower, in turn leading
to lower total production and lower wage rates. Due to the negative relation between wages and
the labour share, the opportunity cost of leisure is lower in economies with a higher labour share,
allowing for a higher short-run drop in the labour supply and, consequently, on output. Moreover,
as an economy with a higher labour share has a higher weight of labour on production, the same
decrease in the labour supply leads to a more pronounced decrease in output. These two distinct
eﬀects generate the positive relationship between the labour share and the impact ﬁscal multipliers.
Regarding the cumulative ﬁscal multipliers, we ﬁnd diﬀerent results dependent on the type of
the ﬁscal consolidation program employed. Under the consolidation via spending, the relationship
between the labour share and the ﬁscal multiplier remains positive throughout all periods. Under
the consolidation via taxation, the relationship becomes negative following the ﬁrst period after the
ﬁscal shock, as the aforementioned drop in capital will have more severe consequences for a higher
weight of capital on total production.
In the multi-country exercise, we get that the Spearman correlation between the ﬁscal multipliers
generated by our model and the labour shares is 70.3% when considering a consolidation via
spending and -41.0% when considering a consolidation via taxation. These results show that the
positive relationship between the labour share and the impact ﬁscal multiplier holds even when
taking into account country-speciﬁc data moments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss some of the recent
relevant literature. In section 3we describe the overlapping generationsmodel employed and present
the ﬁscal consolidation experiments. Section 4 details the model calibration. Section 5 describes
the mechanisms behind the two types of ﬁscal consolidation policies and how the labour share
aﬀects the chain of events, along with the cross-country exercise. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Related Literature
The literature assessing which factors aﬀect the ﬁscal multiplier is vast and diverse. Blanchard and
Leigh (2013) and Blanchard and Leigh (2014) ﬁnd that the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
severely underestimated the impacts of ﬁscal consolidation programs across European countries
following the Great Recession, thus showing that not all factors aﬀecting the ﬁscal multipliers were
taken into consideration.
Alesina et al. (2015b) study the diﬀerences between tax-based consolidations and spending-
based ones. The authors’ main ﬁnding is that tax-based consolidations are much more costly in
terms of output losses, as this type of programs produce deeper and longer recessions. Ilzetzki et al.
(2013) show that the ﬁscal multiplier depends crucially on key country characteristics, such as the
level of development, exchange rate regime and openness to trade. They conclude that the ﬁscal
eﬀect is larger in developed countries, operating under predetermined exchange rate and closed
to trade. Anderson et al. (2016) ﬁnd that unexpected government spending shocks have diﬀerent
eﬀects on consumers depending on their income and age levels. Following an unexpected increase
in the government spending, consumption levels drop signiﬁcantly for the wealthiest and working-
age individuals, whereas consumption of the poorest increases the most. Pappa et al. (2015) study
how corruption and tax evasion relate to the recessive impacts of ﬁscal consolidation shocks, and
ﬁnd that the increase in taxation motivates production in the shadow economy. As this economy is
characterized by considerable lower productivity levels, output drops even further.
Carroll et al. (2014) ﬁnd that the higher the proportion of ﬁnancially constrained agents in an
economy, the higher the consumption multiplier. This result is a direct consequence of credit-
constrained agents exhibiting a higher marginal propensity to consume. Relatedly, Brinca et al.
(2016) show that higher wealth inequality is associated with stronger expansionary impacts of in-
creases in government expenditures, precisely because higher wealth inequality is associated with
a higher number of credit constrained agents. Brinca et al. (2019b) document a strong positive
relationship between income inequality and the output losses deriving from a ﬁscal consolidation
shock. As income inequality induces a precautionary savings behaviour, the share of credit con-
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strained agents decreases. Given that credit constrained agents do not respond to future income
changes, the lower the share of these agents in the economy, the higher the output losses. Brinca
et al. (2019a) address the non-linear eﬀects of both expansionary and contractionary ﬁscal policies,
showing that the ﬁscal multipliers are increasing in the shock.
With regards to the labour share, several studies have attempted to pinpoint the causes of its
heterogeneity across countries and time. Technological diﬀerences are often presented as one of
the main causes (see OECD (2012), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), Arpaia et al. (2009)), since
the diﬀusion of information and communication technologies allows for cheaper capital goods and
better production processes, leading to automation and capital deepening. Institutional factors such
as the minimumwage, the unemployment rate and beneﬁts, and the bargaining power of workers are
also recurrent in the literature. The workers’ bargaining power puts upward pressure on the wage
rate and, subsequently, on the labour share. Oppositely, high unemployment leads to a decrease in
the labour share, since the wage demands of workers are lower. Unemployment beneﬁts put upward
pressure on the labour share, as the reservation wages of workers are higher (see OECD (2012),
ILO (2013), IMF (2007)).
3 Model
In this section, we detail the model used to study the ﬁscal consolidation episodes. The model is
similar to the one proposed in Brinca et al. (2016), which is an overlapping generations model with
heterogeneous agents, incomplete markets, exogenous credit constraints, uninsurable idiosyncratic
risk and a bequest motive as introduced in Brinca et al. (2019b)
3.1 Technology
A representative ﬁrm produces output according to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt(Kt, Lt) = K
α
t L
1−α
t (1)
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where Kt is the capital input in period t and Lt is the labour input in eﬃciency units, in period t.
The evolution of capital is given by:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (2)
where It is the gross investment in period t and δ is the annual capital depreciation rate. Every
period, the ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts by eﬃciently choosing Lt and Kt:
max
Lt,Kt
Πt = Yt − [wtLt + (rt + δ)Kt] (3)
In a competitive equilibrium, the wage per eﬃcient unit of labour, wt, will be equal to the
marginal product of labour, and the rental price of capital, rt, is equal to the marginal product of
capital:
wt =
∂Yt
∂Lt
= (1− α)
(
Kt
Lt
)α
(4)
rt =
∂Yt
∂Kt
= α
(
Lt
Kt
)1−α
− δ (5)
3.2 Demographics
The economy is populated by J overlapping generations of households, which have a ﬁnite lifespan.
Households start life at age 20 and retire at age 65. Each period in the model accounts for 1 year,
meaning there are 45 periods of active work life. The age of a household is denoted by j. Retired
households face an age-dependent probability of dying, π(j), and die for certain when reaching the
age of 100. Letting ω(j) = 1 − π(j) denote the age-dependent probability of survival, it follows
from the law of large numbers that the probability mass of retired agents with age j ≥ 65 still
alive in each period is given by Ωj =
∏i=j
i=65
ω(i). Upon death, retired households leave unintended
bequests which are redistributed to living households in a lump-sum manner. We denote Γ as the
per-household bequest. There is no population growth, so the size of the total population is ﬁxed.
The size of each new cohort is normalized to 1.
Households are heterogeneous not only with respects to their age but also regarding their
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subjective discount factor, β, their permanent ability, a, and their idiosyncratic productivity. A
household’s subjective discount factor can take one of three values with equal probability, β ∈
{β1, β2, β3}, taken as constant over time. The permanent ability of each household is realized at
birth and follows a normal distribution with zero mean, a ∼ N(0, σ2a).
3.3 Labour Income
The wage of a given worker i, in period t, is given by:
wi,t(j, a, u) = wte
γ1j+γ2j2+γ3j3+a+ut (6)
where wt is the wage per eﬃcient unit of labour resulting from equation 4, γ1, γ2 and γ3 capture the
age proﬁle of the worker, a ∼ N(0, σ2a) is the worker’s permanent ability and u is the idiosyncratic
productivity shock that is realized in each period. This shock follows an AR(1) process:
ut = ρut−1 + ǫt, ǫ ∼ N(0, σ
2
ǫ ) (7)
where ρ is the persistence of the shock.
3.4 Preferences
We employ a momentary constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function for each household,
U(c, n), which depends positively on consumption, c, and negatively on hours worked, n ∈ ]0, 1].
The utility function takes the following functional form:
U(c, n) =
c1−σ
1− σ
− χ
n1+η
1 + η
(8)
where σ is the risk-aversion parameter and η is the inverse Frisch elasticity. Every period of their
active work-life, households decide how many hours to work, n, how much to consume, c, and
how much to save, k′. Retired households do not supply any labour, but receive a social security
payment, Ψt.
The utility of retired households has an additional term, D(Γ), which positively relates to the
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bequest these households leave when they die:
D(Γ) = ϕlog(Γ) (9)
3.5 Government
The government runs a balanced social security system, inwhich the retirees receive annual pensions,
Ψt, and employees and the employer (the representative ﬁrm) are taxed at rates τSS and τ˜SS ,
respectively.
The government also takes policy actions, where it taxes consumption and capital and labour
income in order to ﬁnance expenditures on pure public consumption goods, Gt, interest payments
on the sovereign debt, rBt, and lump-sum redistributions, gt. We take the sovereign debt-to-output
ratio, By =
Bt
Yt
, as constant over time. We employ the functional form proposed in Benabou (2002)
to model the non-linear taxation on labour income.1
τ(y) = 1− θ0y
−θ1 (10)
where y stands for the pre-tax labour income and τ(y) is the average tax rate given the pre-tax
income y. The parameters θ0 and θ1 account for the level and the progressivity of the tax code,
respectively.
DenotingRt as the government’s revenue from taxation on labour, capital and consumption, and
RSSt as the government’s revenue from social security taxes, the government budget constraints in
the steady-state take the following form:
g
(
45 +
∑
j≥65
Ωj
)
= R−G− rB (11)
ψ
(∑
j≥65
Ωj
)
= RSS (12)
1A further discussion of the properties of this tax function is provided in Appendix A.1.
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3.6 Recursive Formulation of the Household Problem
In any given period, each household is characterized by the vector (k, β, a, u, j), where k is the
household’s savings, β ∈ {β1, β2, β3} is the time discount factor, a is the permanent ability, u is the
idiosyncratic shock, and j is the household’s age. We can formulate the working-age household’s
optimization problem as follows:
V (k, β, a, u, j) = max
c, k′, n
[
U (c, n) + βEu′
[
V (k′, β, a, u, j + 1)
]]
s.t. c (1 + τc) + k
′ = (k + Γ)(1 + r(1− τk)) + g + Y
L
n ∈]0, 1], k′ ≥ −b, c > 0
(13)
where Y L is the labour income after taxes, b is the borrowing limit, and τSS and τ˜SS are the social
security taxes paid by the employee and by the employer, respectively.
The optimization problem of a retired household is similar to that of an active household,
with the exception of not supplying any labour, receiving annual retiree beneﬁts, having an age-
dependent probability of dying π(j), and gaining utility, D(Γ), from leaving a bequest. Hence, we
can formulate the retired household’s optimization problem as follows:
V (k, β, j) = max
c, k′
[
U (c, n) + β(1− π(j))V (k′, β, j + 1) + π(j)D(Γ)
]
s.t. c (1 + τc) + k
′ = (k + Γ) (1 + r(1− τk)) + g + ψ
k′ ≥ 0, c > 0
(14)
3.7 Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Let Φ(k, β, a, u, j) be the measure of households with the corresponding characteristics. The
stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
1. Given the factor prices and the initial conditions, the consumers’ optimization problem
is solved by the value function V (k, β, a, u, j) and the policy functions, c(k, β, a, u, j),
k′(k, β, a, u, j), and n(k, β, a, u, j).
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2. Markets clear:
K +B =
∫
k dΦ
L =
∫
n(k, β, a, u, j) dΦ
∫
c dΦ + δK +G = KαL1−α
3. The factor prices satisfy:
w = (1− α)
(
K
L
)α
r = α
(
L
K
)1−α
− δ
4. The government budget balances:
g
∫
dΦ +G+ rB =
∫ (
τkr(k + Γ) + τcc+ nτl
(
nw(a, u, j)
1 + τ˜SS
))
dΦ
5. The social security system balances:
ψ
∫
j≥65
dΦ =
τ˜SS + τSS
1 + τ˜SS
(∫
j≥65
nwdΦ
)
6. The assets of the deceased are uniformly distributed among the living:
Γ
∫
ω(j)dΦ =
∫
(1− ω(j))kdΦ
3.8 Fiscal Experiment and Transition
The ﬁscal consolidation experiment we employ is similar to the one in Brinca et al. (2019b). The
economy is initially in the steady-state and the government unexpectedly announces a reduction of
the sovereign debt-to-output ratio, By, by 10p.p., during the course of 50 periods. Two diﬀerent
policies can be employed in order to achieve this result: either the government spending,G, decreases
by 0.2% of the steady-state GDP every period, or the labour income tax, τl, increases by 0.1% of
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the steady-state GDP every period, for all agents. After the 50 periods of consolidation, either the
government spending or the labour tax return to the initial level. The economy takes an additional
50 periods to converge to the new steady-state equilibrium, now with the lower debt-to-GDP ratio.
The deﬁnition of a transition equilibrium after the ﬁscal experiment is detailed in appendix A.2.
The diﬀerence to the stationary equilibrium is an added time variable, t, which captures all the
changes in policy and price variables relevant in this maximization problem along the transition to
the lower debt-to-GDP steady state.
3.9 Definition of the Fiscal Multiplier
The impact and cumulative multiplier are deﬁned as in Brinca et al. (2019b). Considering the ﬁscal
consolidation episode via government spending, we deﬁne the impact multiplier as:
Impact multiplier G =
∆Y1
∆G1
(15)
where∆Y1 is the change of output from period 0 to period 1 and∆G1 is the change in government
spending from period 0 to period 1. The corresponding cumulative multiplier, at time T , is:
Cumulative multiplier G(T ) =
∑t=T
t=1
(∏s=T−1
s=0
1
1+rs
)
∆Yt∑t=T
t=1
(∏s=T−1
s=0
1
1+rs
)
∆Gt
(16)
Regarding the ﬁscal consolidation episode via taxation, we deﬁne the impact multiplier as:
Impact multiplier τl =
∆Y1
∆R1
(17)
where∆Y1 is the change of output from period 0 to period 1 and∆R1 is the change in government
revenue from period 0 to period 1. The corresponding cumulative multiplier, at time T , is:
Cumulative multiplier τl(T ) =
∑t=T
t=1
(∏s=T−1
s=0
1
1+rs
)
∆Yt∑t=T
t=1
(∏s=T−1
s=0
1
1+rs
)
∆Rt
(18)
11
4 Calibration
The model described in Section 3 is calibrated to the German economy, following the same method-
ology of Brinca et al. (2016), Bernardino (2019), Brinca et al. (2019a) and Brinca et al. (2019b).
Germany arises as a natural choice since it is the largest economy in Europe, and will serve as the
benchmark scenario. Certain parameters are calibrated outside of the model, as they have direct
empirical or theoretical counterparts. Tables 3 and 4 list the corresponding calibration results. The
remaining parameters are calibrated endogenously, using a simulated method of moments (SMM)
approach. Table 6 lists the corresponding calibration results. We follow the same calibration
strategy for the cross-country exercise, holding the parameters listed in table 3 as constant.
4.1 Wages
To estimate the age proﬁle of wages, γ1, γ2 and γ3 (see equation 6), we use data from the Luxembourg
Income Study (LIS) and run the following regression for each country:
ln(wi) = ln(w) + γ1j + γ2j
2 + γ3j
3 + ǫi (19)
where w is the wage rate from equation 4 and j is the age of individual i. The estimated values of
γ1, γ2 and γ3 are in table 4.
The variance of the ability, σa, is held constant across countries and set equal to the average of
the European countries analyzed in Brinca et al. (2016). The persistence of the idiosyncratic shock,
ρ, is also unchanged across countries and equal to the value used in Brinca et al. (2016), who use
U.S. data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)2. The variance of the idiosyncratic
risk, σǫ, is endogenously calibrated, as detailed in section 4.5.
4.2 Preferences and the Borrowing Limit
The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, η, is set to 1, following Trabandt and Uhlig
(2011) and Guner et al. (2016), and held constant across countries. The disutility of hours worked,
2The persistence of the idiosyncratic shock is estimated based on the U.S. since most European countries do not
have suﬃcient data to perform a consistent estimation.
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χ, the subjective discount factors, β1, β2, β3 and the bequest motive, ϕ, are endogenously calibrated.
The borrowing limit, b, is also endogenously calibrated, as detailed in section 4.5.
4.3 Taxes and Social Security
We employ the labour income tax function detailed in equation (10), using U.S. labour income tax
data provided by the OECD to estimate θ0 and θ1 for diﬀerent family types.3 To obtain the tax
function for a single households, we compute a weighted average of θ0 and θ1, where the weights
correspond to the share of each family type in the total population.
The employer social security rate, τ˜SS , and the employee social security rate, τSS , are set to the
average tax rates between 2001 and 2007 for each country. The consumption tax rate, τc, and the
capital tax rate, τk, were taken from Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). Table 4 summarizes the estimated
tax rates for each country.
4.4 Labour Share
The unadjusted labour share is commonly computed as the ratio of total compensation of employees
– wages and salaries before taxes, plus employers’ social contributions - over the national income
aggregate (see Guerriero (2019)). However, this method excludes the income from the self-
employed, leading to an underestimation of the true share of labour income. To overcome this issue,
we employ the novel microdata-adjusted labour-share estimations put forward by the International
Labour Organization (ILO). The proposed adjustment takes into account the heterogeneity of
workers within the self-employed by dividing these workers into three diﬀerent subgroups: own-
account workers (OAW), contributing family workers (CFW), and employers (ERS). The resulting
adjusted labour income share is thus given by:
LS =
CE
Y
·
%Employees+ γOAW ·%OAW + γCFW ·%CFW + γERS ·%ERS
%Employees
(20)
where CE is the total compensation of employees, Y is the national income aggregate and γOAW ,
γCFW , γERS are the relative wages of each group of the self-employed workers. The methodological
3The level and progressivity of the tax code are estimated based on the U.S. since most European countries do not
have suﬃcient data to perform a consistent estimation.
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description of the relative wages’ estimation can be found in ILO (2019).
4.5 Parameters Calibrated Endogenously
We use the simulated method of moments (SMM) approach to calibrate the parameters which do
not have any direct empirical counterpart: ϕ, β1, β2, β3, b, χ, σǫ. We minimize the following loss
function:
L(ϕ, β1, β2, β3, b, χ, σǫ) = ||Mm −Md|| (21)
whereMd are the data moments andMm are the corresponding model moments.
Since we are endogenously calibrating seven parameters, we require seven target data moments
in order to have an exactly identiﬁed system. The chosen datamoments, listed in table 5, are the same
as in Brinca et al. (2019b): the average fraction of yearly hours worked, n¯ , the capital-to-output
ratio, K/Y , the variance of the natural logarithm of wages, Var(lnw), the three quartiles of the
cumulative net wealth distribution, Q25, Q50, Q75, and the average net asset position of households
with 75 to 80 years-old relative to the mean net wealth in the economy, k¯75−80/k¯.
Table 6 displays the endogenously calibrated parameters and the corresponding calibration
errors for the 9 European countries analyzed in the cross-country exercise, including the benchmark
economy. The average value of the loss function across countries is 1.22. Table 1 displays the
values of the data moments for the benchmark economy, along with the values produced by our
model. As shown, we ﬁt all the targeted data moments with very low error margins.
Data Moment Description Source Data Value Model Value
k¯75−80/k¯ Mean wealth age 75-80 / mean wealth LWS 1.513 1.513
K/Y Capital-output ratio PWT 3.013 3.013
Var(lnw) Variance of log wages LIS 0.354 0.354
n¯ Fraction of hours worked OECD 0.190 0.190
Q25, Q50, Q75 Wealth Quartiles LWS -0.004, 0.027, 0.179 -0.004, 0.030, 0.175
Table 1: Calibration ﬁt of the benchmark economy.
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5 Results
In this section, we describe the simulations undertaken, the ﬁndings resultant from each experiment
and the implied relationship between the labour share and the recessive impacts of ﬁscal consol-
idation programs. We assess whether such relation is strong enough to hold even when taking
into account diﬀerent country characteristics by performing a multi-country exercise, along with a
robustness analysis.
5.1 Mechanisms behind the Fiscal Consolidation Programs
We employ the ﬁscal experiment described in section 3.8. The economy departs from the steady-
state and the government unexpectedly announces a reduction of the sovereign debt-to-output ratio
by 10p.p., during the course of 50 periods. The debt reduction program can be ﬁnanced either
through a reduction in government spending or an increase in the labour income tax rate.
As the government pays its debt, the number of government bonds available in the economy
decrease, which leads households to gradually shift their savings towards physical capital. This
shift in savings drives up the capital-to-labour ratio. With more capital per worker, the marginal
productivity of labour rises. Since market clearing conditions imply that the marginal productivity
of labour is equal to the wage rate (see equation 4), wages and output gradually increase to a higher
level in the long-run. With gradually increasing wages, the expected life-time income of workers
rises, so the total labour supply drops in the short-run. Consequently, output falls in the short-run.
In the case of a consolidation via labour income taxes, τl, another mechanism is at play. The
increase in the tax rate leads to a drop in theworkers’ after-tax income, which reduces the opportunity
cost of leisure. As such, the labour supply, and consequently output, will decrease even further in
the short-run.
5.2 Fiscal Multipliers and the Labour Share
To evaluate the sensibility of the ﬁscal multiplier to the labour share, we change the value of the
labour share from low to high in the benchmark economy calibrated to Germany. In order to isolate
the eﬀect of the labour share, we re-calibrate the model in each experiment to match the initial data
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moments. Table 2 summarizes the main diﬀerences in the benchmark economywhen the calibration
is made taking into account diﬀerent labour share values.
Labour Share 48.1% 54.5% 60.2% 66.0% 73.2%
Capital-Labour ratio 9.884 7.540 6.247 5.200 4.513
GDP per capita 1.000 0.761 0.629 0.520 0.453
Wage rate 1.000 0.865 0.790 0.730 0.694
Table 2: The eﬀects of the labour share. The values accruing to the GDP per capita and the wage rate were normalized so that the corresponding
highest values are equal to 1.
Due to the higher weight of labour on production, an economy with a higher labour share
has a lower capital-to-labour ratio.4 As already noted, the marginal productivity of labour, and
consequently GDP per capita, are positively related to the ratio between capital and labour. Hence,
both these variables are lower under higher values of the labour share. Under market clearing
conditions, the wage rate will also be lower (see equation 4).
5.2.1 Impact Multipliers and the Labour Share
Figure 2 shows a positive relationship between the labour share and the impact multiplier from a
consolidation via spending. As we increase the labour share from 48.1% to 73.2%, the impact
multiplier rises from 0.424 to 0.470. Two distinct eﬀects generate this positive relationship: Firstly,
given the negative relationship between wages and the labour share (see Table 2), the opportunity
cost of leisure is lower for higher labour share values, implying a higher drop in the labour supply
following the ﬁscal shock. Secondly, due to the higher weight of labour on production, an economy
with a higher labour share has a more pronounced decrease in output for the same decrease in the
labour supply.
With regards to the consolidation via labour income taxation, we similarly ﬁnd that an economy
with a higher labour share has a more pronounced impact multiplier. As we increase the labour
share from 48.1% to 73.2%, the impact multiplier goes from -1.716 to -1.758. The two mechanisms
at play are the same as in a consolidation via spending, but the eﬀects from the ﬁscal shock are
4This result is standard in canonical Real Business Cycle (RBC) models. The steady-state capital-labor ratio in a
standard de-centralized RBC model is K
L
= ( αA
r+δ
)
1
1−α . For a formal derivation see King and Rebelo (1999).
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Figure 2: Impact multipliers for the consolidation via government spending (upper panels) and for the consolidation via labour taxation (lower
panels). On the left panels we have the output impact multipliers, while on the right panels we have the labour impact multipliers.
more severe. Since the rise in the tax rate lowers the workers’ after-tax income, the opportunity cost
of leisure is lower. As such, the labour supply, and consequently output, decrease even further on
impact. This result is in accordance to what is standard in the literature (see Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and Alesina et al. (2015b)).
5.2.2 Cumulative Multipliers and the Labour Share
The labour share inﬂuences not only the impact multipliers, but also the cumulative multipliers.
Figure 3 shows the cumulative multipliers of the benchmark economy for the 5 periods during and
immediately after the ﬁscal consolidation shock, under diﬀerent labour share values.
Regarding the consolidation via spending reduction, both output and labour multipliers are
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Figure 3: Cumulative multipliers for the consolidation via government spending (upper panels) and for the consolidation via labour taxation (lower
panels). On the left panels we have the output cumulative multipliers, on the middle panels we have the labour cumulative multipliers and on the
right panels we have the capital cumulative multipliers.
higher for economies with a higher labour share, even after the impact period. The drop in the
labour supply is not strong enough for workers to consume their savings, so capital is not negatively
aﬀected in the following period. The gradual rise in capital arises from the crowding-in of savings
from debt to capital, following the government debt repayment. This rise is more pronounced for
higher values of the labour share, due to inter-temporal substitution eﬀects: Given the lower weight
of capital on production, the growth in the marginal productivity of workers will be lower for higher
values of the labour share. Due to market clearing conditions, wage growth is also less pronounced.
As such, total savings, and consequently total capital formation, are higher.
In the case of a consolidation via labour income taxes, the relationship between the labour share
and the ﬁscal multiplier becomes negative after the ﬁrst period. In this type of consolidation, the
drop in the labour supply is strong enough to make workers consume their savings, implying a
decrease in capital in the following periods. In turn, the marginal productivity of labour, wages and
output, fall. As the drop in capital has stronger negative consequences for economies with a lower
labour share, the relationship between the labour share and the ﬁscal multiplier inverts after the ﬁrst
period.
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5.3 Cross-country analysis
In the previous section, we showed that our model produces a positive relationship between the
labour share and impact ﬁscal multipliers when considering ﬁscal consolidation programs. In
this section we perform a cross-country analysis to show that the mechanism is strong enough to
hold even when taking into account a wide range of diﬀerent country-speciﬁc data moments. The
model is calibrated to 9 European countries: Austria (AUT), Czech Republic (CZR), France (FRA),
Germany (GER), Italy (ITA), the Netherlands (NLD), Portugal (PRT), Slovakia (SVK) and Spain
(ESP).5 Table 5 describes the country-speciﬁc data moments for the countries in study. Table 6
displays the endogenously calibrated parameters and the corresponding calibration errors for each
country. Parameters calibrated exogenously are listed in Table 4. Parameters held constant for all
the countries are summarized in Table 3.
Figure 4 shows that countries with a higher share of labour income have, on average, more
sizeable ﬁscal multipliers, in the context of the ﬁscal consolidation episode described in section 3.8.
The Spearman correlations between the ﬁscal multipliers generated by our model and the labour
shares are 70.3% when considering a consolidation via spending and -41.0% when considering
a consolidation via taxation. As such, even when introducing substantial country heterogeneity,
we ﬁnd that our model reproduces a positive relationship between the labour share and the impact
multiplier. Moreover, and in accordance to our ﬁndings in section 5.2.1, tax-based consolidations
produce deeper recessions across countries than consolidations via spending. Table 8 shows that,
for the 9 European countries in our sample, the ﬁscal multiplier is on average 2.8 times higher when
the ﬁscal consolidation is done via labour taxation.
To test for the robustness of our ﬁndings, we employ a diﬀerent cross-country labour share
estimation. We now adopt the novel adjusted labour-share estimations provided the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This adjustment does not take into account
the heterogeneity within the self-employed, and is based on total working hours, rather than the
5This sample was determined by data availability.
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Figure 4: Impact multipliers and the labour share. On the left panel we have the cross-country relation for a consolidation via government spending
(Spearman correlation coeﬃcient 0.703), while on the right panel we have the cross-country relation for a consolidation via labour taxation (Spearman
correlation coeﬃcient -0.410).
total number of workers. The resulting adjusted labour income share is thus given by:
LS =
CE
Y
·
Total hours worked by persons employed
Total hours worked by employees
(22)
Figure 5 corroborates the cross-country relationship between the labour share and the ﬁscal multipli-
ers detailed above. Countries with a higher labour share experience larger output drops on impact,
both for tax and spending based consolidations. Using this diﬀerent labour share estimation, the
Figure 5: Impact multipliers and the labour share, using OECD estimations. On the left panel we have the cross-country relation for a consolidation
via government spending (Spearman correlation coeﬃcient 0.667), while on the right panel we have the cross-country relation for a consolidation
via labour taxation (Spearman correlation coeﬃcient -0.500).
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Spearman correlations between the ﬁscal multipliers generated by our model and the labour shares
are 66.7% when considering a consolidation via spending and -50.0% when considering a consol-
idation via taxation. We once again ﬁnd that tax-based consolidations produce deeper recessions
across countries than spending-based ones. As listed in Table 9, the ﬁscal multiplier is on average
2.9 times higher for a tax-based consolidation.
6 Conclusion
This paper assesses how the labour share of income aﬀects the mechanisms behind ﬁscal consolida-
tion programs. We motivate this study by showing a pronounced labour-share heterogeneity within
a sample of 15 European countries, along with a renewed academic interest in the structural factors
aﬀecting the ﬁscal multipliers.
We calibrate a life-cycle, overlapping generations model to a benchmark economy (Germany),
under diﬀerent labour share values. We ﬁnd that a higher share of labour income induces a lower
capital-to-labour ratio, a lower wage rate and a lower GDP per capita.
We then study how each of the calibrated economies react to an unexpected debt reduction
program, ﬁnanced either through a decrease in government spending or an increase in labour
income taxation. We ﬁnd that a consolidation via labour taxation has more severe eﬀects than
reductions in government spending: As the disposable income of workers is particularly aﬀected
with the tax increase, the short-run labour supply drops considerably more. This drop is strong
enough tomakeworkers consume their savings, so capital actually decreases in the following period.
Our results also show a positive relationship between the labour share and the impact ﬁscal
multipliers, regardless of the ﬁscal instrument employed. We ﬁnd two mechanisms at play: Firstly,
as the opportunity cost of leisure is lower for higher labour share values, the drop in the labour supply
following the ﬁscal shock is larger. Secondly, due to the higher weight of labour on production, the
decrease in output for the same decrease in the labour is also higher. Following the announcement
period, we get diﬀerent results dependent on ﬁscal instrument employed by the government. Under
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the consolidation via spending, the relationship between the labour share and the ﬁscal multiplier
remains positive throughout all periods. Under the consolidation via taxation, the relationship
becomes negative following the ﬁrst period after the ﬁscal shock, as the aforementioned drop in
capital will have more severe consequences for a higher weight of capital on total production.
The positive relationship between the labour share and the impact ﬁscal multiplier is strong
enough to hold even when taking into account a wide range of country-speciﬁc data moments from
a sample of 9 European economies. As such, it is important to consider the labour share of income
when evaluating ﬁscal multipliers across countries.
Our calibrations do not take into consideration the causes of labour share disparities across the
countries in study. As such, further research is needed towards assessing how each source aﬀects
the ﬁscal multipliers. Moreover, since we treat certain parameters as constant, future research
should test for the validity of such assumptions. As our analysis only evaluates ﬁscal consolidation
programs, further studies are required to assess expansionary policies.
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A Appendix
A.1 Tax Function
6 Given the tax function
ya = θ0y
1−θ1
which we employ, the average tax rate is deﬁned as
ya = [1− τ(y)]y
and thus
θ0y
1−θ1 = [1− τ(y)]y
and thus
1− τ(y) = θ0y
−θ1
τ(y) = 1− θ0y
−θ1
T (y) = τ(y).y = y − θ0y
1−θ1
T ′(y) = 1− (1− θ1)θ0y
−θ1
Thus the tax wedge for any two incomes (y1, y2) is given by:
1−
1− τ(y2)
1− τ(y1)
= 1−
(
y2
y1
)−θ1
(23)
and therefore independently of the scaling parameter θ0. Thus by construction one can raise
average taxes by lowering θ0 and not change the progressivity of the tax code, since (as long as tax
progressivity is deﬁned by the tax wedges) the progressivity of the tax code is uniquely determined
6This appendix is borrowed from Holter et al. (2019)
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by the parameter θ1.7
A.2 Definition of a Transition Equilibrium after the Unanticipated Fiscal Consolidation Shock
8Wedeﬁne a recursive competitive equilibrium along the transition between steady states as follows:
Given the initial capital stock, the initial distribution of households and initial taxes, respectively
K0, φ0 and {τl, τc, τk, τSS, τ˜SS}
t=∞
t=1 , a competitive equilibrium is a sequence of individual functions
for the household, {Vt, ct, k
′
t, nt}
t=∞
t=1 , of production plans for the ﬁrm, {Kt, Lt}
t=∞
t=1 , factor prices,
{rt, wt}, government transfer {gt, Ψt, Gt}
t=∞
t=1 , government debt, {Bt}
t=∞
t=1 , inheritance from the
dead, {Γt}
t=∞
t=1 , and of measures, {Φt}
t=∞
t=1 , such that for all t:
1. Given the factor prices and the initial conditions the consumers’ optimization problem is solved
by the value function V (k, β, a, u, j) and the policy functions c(k, β, a, u, j), k′(k, β, a, u, j),
and n(k, β, a, u, j)
2. Markets clear:
Kt+1 +Bt =
∫
kt dΦt
Lt =
∫
nt(kt, β, a, u, j) dΦt
∫
ct dΦt +Kt+1 +Gt = (1− δ)Kt +K
αL1−α
3. The factor prices satisfy:
wt = (1− α)
(
Kt
Lt
)α
rt = α
(
Lt
Kt
)1−α
− δ
7Note that
1− τ(y) =
1− T ′(y)
1− θ1
> 1− T ′(y)
and thus as long as θ1 ∈]0, 1[ we have that
T ′(y) > τ(y)
and thus marginal tax rates are higher than average tax rates for all incomes.
8This appendix is borrowed from Brinca et al. (2019b).
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4. The government budget balances:
gt
∫
dΦt+Gt+rtBt =
∫ (
τkrt(kt + Γt) + τcct + ntτl
(
ntwt(a, u, j)
1 + τ˜SS
))
dΦt+(Bt+1−Bt)
5. The social security system balances:
ψt
∫
j≥65
dΦt =
τ˜SS + τSS
1 + τ˜SS
(∫
j≥65
ntwtdΦt
)
6. The assets of the dead are uniformly distributed among the living:
Γt
∫
ω(j)tdΦt =
∫
(1− ω(j))ktdΦt
7. Aggregate law of motion:
φt+1 = γt(φt)
A.3 Additional Figures and Tables
Parameter Value Description Source
δ 0.06 Depreciation rate of capital Literature
ρ 0.335 Persistence in equation 7 Estimated with PSID 1968-1997
σa 0.423 Variance of the ability Brinca et al. (2016)
σ 1.2 Risk-aversion factor Literature
η 1 Inverse Frisch Elasticity Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
Table 3: Parameters held constant across countries.
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Country
Age profile Taxes Labour Shares
γ1 γ2 γ3 θ0 θ1 τ˜SS τSS τc τk LSILO LSOECD
Austria 0.155 -0.004 3.0e-05 0.939 0.187 0.217 0.181 0.196 0.240 0.582 0.538
Czech R. 0.174 -0.004 3.0e-05 0.988 0.143 0.350 0.125 0.182 0.220 0.518 0.473
France 0.384 -0.008 6.0e-05 0.915 0.142 0.434 0.135 0.183 0.355 0.624 0.567
Germany 0.176 -0.003 2.3e-05 0.881 0.221 0.206 0.210 0.155 0.233 0.602 0.555
Italy 0.114 -0.002 1.4e-05 0.897 0.180 0.329 0.092 0.145 0.340 0.595 0.531
Netherlands 0.307 -0.007 4.9e-05 0.938 0.254 0.102 0.200 0.194 0.293 0.636 0.574
Portugal 0.172 -0.004 2.6e-05 0.937 0.136 0.238 0.110 0.194 0.293 0.624 0.565
Slovakia 0.096 -0.002 1.7e-05 0.974 0.105 0.326 0.131 0.181 0.151 0.459 0.431
Spain 0.114 -0.002 1.4e-05 0.904 0.148 0.305 0.064 0.144 0.296 0.645 0.568
Table 4: Parameters calibrated exogenously. Notes: The age proﬁle of wages, γ1, γ2 and γ3 are estimated according to equation (19), using the most recent LIS survey available before 2008. Data for Portugal
comes from Quadros de Pessoal 2009 database. θ0 and θ1 are estimated according to equation 10. τ˜SS and τSS are the average social security taxes paid by the employer and by the employee, respectively, using
OECD data of 2001-2007. τc and τk come from Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) or calculated using their approach. They represent the average eﬀective tax rate from 1995-2007. LSILO is estimated according to
equation 20. LSOECD is estimated according to equation 22.
2
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Country Q1 Q2 Q3 K/Y n¯ Var ln(w)
Austria -0.0097 0.0225 0.1858 3.359 0.226 0.199
Czech R. 0.0043 0.0612 0.2213 6.203 0.236 0.174
France 0.0010 0.0539 0.2616 3.392 0.184 0.478
Germany -0.0036 0.0273 0.1788 3.013 0.189 0.354
Italy 0.0086 0.1025 0.3237 3.943 0.200 0.225
Netherlands -0.0252 0.0499 0.3026 2.830 0.200 0.282
Portugal 0.0058 0.0821 0.2660 3.229 0.249 0.298
Slovakia 0.0546 0.2069 0.4495 3.799 0.204 0.250
Spain 0.0175 0.1289 0.3417 3.378 0.183 0.225
Table 5: Calibration Targets -Md. Notes: The average share of wealth held by the households in the cohort of 75-80 years old relative to the
total population mean is the 7th target. It was used the U.S. measure which is equal to 1.5134. Q1, Q2 and Q3 are the three quartiles of the
cumulative distribution of net wealth derived from LWS.K/Y is derived from PWT 8.0, average from 1990-2011. n¯ is average hours worked
per capita derived from OECD data 1990-2011. Var ln(w) is the variance of log wages from the most recent LIS survey available before 2008.
Data for Portugal comes from Quadros de Pessoal 2009 database.
Country β1 β2 β3 b χ ϕ σǫ L
Austria 0.945 0.957 0.988 0.06 12.48 3.05 0.201 0.944
Czech R. 0.984 0.987 1.028 -0.02 14.33 7.60 0.136 1.694
France 0.951 0.982 1.006 0.20 16.43 2.96 0.506 0.586
Germany 0.922 0.950 0.984 0.10 14.91 2.77 0.439 0.452
Italy 0.974 0.984 1.006 -0.02 17.20 4.90 0.257 0.847
Netherlands 0.941 0.967 0.979 0.23 14.00 2.55 0.263 0.919
Portugal 0.948 0.953 0.983 0.00 10.65 4.70 0.380 1.041
Slovakia 0.949 0.950 0.960 -0.05 13.50 4.92 0.316 2.479
Spain 0.967 0.975 0.993 -0.10 23.71 5.05 0.258 2.036
Table 6: Parameters calibrated endogenously using ILO labour share estimations. L corresponds to the Loss function value in equation 21.
Country β1 β2 β3 b χ ϕ σǫ L
Austria 0.942 0.950 0.980 0.10 11.38 2.45 0.201 1.429
Czech R. 0.981 0.983 1.024 0.02 12.43 6.30 0.136 1.200
France 0.943 0.974 0.997 0.18 14.43 2.56 0.506 0.853
Germany 0.912 0.943 0.974 0.12 13.71 2.13 0.436 1.150
Italy 0.966 0.976 0.998 -0.02 15.10 4.00 0.257 0.803
Netherlands 0.930 0.955 0.967 0.29 12.50 2.05 0.263 0.880
Portugal 0.940 0.943 0.973 0.00 9.55 3.80 0.380 0.601
Slovakia 0.944 0.945 0.956 -0.11 12.50 4.52 0.316 2.264
Spain 0.955 0.963 0.981 -0.11 20.31 4.05 0.258 1.653
Table 7: Parameters calibrated endogenously, using OECD labour share estimations. L corresponds to the Loss function value in equation 22.
29
Country Multiplier G Multiplier τl |Multiplier τl | / |Multiplier G |
Austria 0.418 -1.168 2.792
Czech R. 0.348 -0.962 2.761
France 0.459 -1.420 3.095
Germany 0.443 -1.735 3.915
Italy 0.435 -1.188 2.732
Netherlands 0.451 -1.489 3.303
Portugal 0.424 -0.956 2.255
Slovakia 0.428 -0.934 2.181
Spain 0.449 -0.994 2.216
Average 0.428 -1.205 2.806
Table 8: Cross-country impact multipliers, using ILO labour share estimations.
Country Multiplier G Multiplier τl |Multiplier τl | / |Multiplier G |
Austria 0.416 -1.188 2.858
Czech R. 0.337 -0.975 2.893
France 0.435 -1.436 3.305
Germany 0.436 -1.710 3.925
Italy 0.413 -1.194 2.890
Netherlands 0.424 -1.507 3.554
Portugal 0.409 -0.957 2.340
Slovakia 0.407 -0.938 2.306
Spain 0.426 -1.020 2.396
Average 0.411 -1.214 2.941
Table 9: Cross-country impact multipliers, using OECD labour share estimations.
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